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PEOPLE 11. VARNUM

(Crim. No. 10190.

In Bank.

[66 C.2d

May 31, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS
LAMAS V ARNUM, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Sufficiency - Circumstantial Evidence: Homicide - Evidence - Sufficiency. - There was sufticient evidence to support verdicts of robbery, kidnaping, and
murder, where a witness saw a service station attendant leave
the station, where he was on duty alone, in the company of
three men, where the station owner subsequently discovered
$50 missing from the cash register, where the attendant's
empty wallet and his body were found and he had been shot,
where defendant and his accomplices were heard planning the
robbery, and later discussing their having killed the victim,
and were seen dividing the money after the robbery and giving
some of it to a neighbor for the use of a gun, and where
defendant's fingerprints were found at the service station, and
a ballistics expert testified that the bullets had been fired by a
gun such as the one defendant had taken with him.
[Sa, 2b] ld.-Evidence-Weapons.-Where, in a prosecution for
robbery, kidnaping, and murder, the location of the murder
wel;Lpon was learned from non-coercive questioning of an
accomplice and his wife who had not been warned of their
constitutional rights, defendant did not have standing to
challenge the violation of these rights and the gun could be
used in evidence against him.
[3] ld.-Rights of Accused-As to Aid of Counsel and Remaining
Silent.-There is nothing unlawful in questioning & suspect
who has not been warned of his constitutional rights so long
as the police refrain from physically and psychologically
coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not use
against the suspect any evidence obtained.
[4a, 4b] Witnesses-Impeachment-Prior Conviction. - Where,
during defendant's trial for robbery, kidnaping, and murder, &
prosecution witness who had already been convicted for lending the murder weapon to defendant for the purpose of the
contemplated robbery claimed his privilege against selfincrimination, whereupon the trial court brought out the fact
that he w~s no longer subject to prosecution because he had
already been convicted and ordered him to answer the questions, but where the witness then denied any personal involve-

McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 585; Homicide,
§ 145(3); [2] Criminal Law, § 536(1); [3] Criminal Law, § 106.5;
[4,5] Witnesses, § 227; [6, 9] Criminal Law, §§ 572, 1011; [7, 8]
Criminal Law, § 1011.
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ment and any knowledge of defendant's having taken part in
the crimes, no error was committed by the court even if its
purpose had been to impeach the witness instead of to rule on
his claim of privilege.
[6] Id.-Impeachment-Prior Conviction.-In a criminal prosecution it is entirely proper for the court to elicit the fact that a
witness has been convicted as an accomplice in the crime
charged.
[6] Crimjnal Law - Judgment - Determination of PunishmentProcedure for Determining Penalty: Evidence-Accomplices
and Corroboration.-There was reversible error where, during
the penalty phase of a trial for kidnaping and murder, the
prosecution encouraged the jury to aggravate defendant's punishment by evidence consisting solely of testimony of a witness
who claimed to be defendant's accomplice in robberies committed shortly before those for which he was tried, and where
this evidence, contrary to statute (Pen. Code, § 1111), was
uncorroborated.
[7] Id.-Judgment-Determination ~f Punishment-Procedure for
Determining Penalty.-Although evidence of an earlier crime
may be introduced at a trial of the penalty phase of a first
degree murder case, such evidence must meet the rules of
admissibility governing proof of that crime or be otherwise
properly admissible in the penalty proceeding.
[8] Id. - Judgment - Determination of Penalty - Procedure for
Determining Penalty.-At a trial on the issue of penalty the
corpus delicti of an earlier crime must be established before
an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession can be admitted,
and an earlier crime cannot be proved by hearsay.
[9] Id -Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure
for Determining Penalty: Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-Pen. Code, § 1111, prohibiting proof of an earlier
crime by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, also
. applies at a trial on the issue of penalty.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed in part
and affirmed in part.
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit robbery, first
degree robbery, kidnaping with bodily harm for the purpose
of robbery, and first degree murder. Judgment of conviction
imposing death penalty on murder charge and fixing penalty
. [6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 270 et seq.

..,..
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for kidnaping at life imprisonment reversed insofar as it relates to penalty; affirmed in all other respects.
Thomas Lamas Varnum, in pro. per., and Lester M. Fleischner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon Ringer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of assault with intent to commit robbery, first degree robbery, kidnaping with bodily harm for the purpose of robbery, and first
degree murder. It fixed the penalty for kidnaping at life imprisonment without possibility of parole and the penalty for
murder at death. A motion for new trial was denied. The
appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
At a previous trial the jury fixed the penalty at death for
the kidnaping and murder. We reversed the jUdgment only as
to penalty because of errors condemned in People v. Morse
(1964) 60 Ca1.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]. (People
v. Varn:um (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 425 [38 Cal.Rptr. 881, 392 P.2d
961] .) Before retrial, however, we issued a writ of habeas
corpus and reversed the judgment in its entirety on the
ground that confessions introduced in evidence had been obtained in violation of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478
[12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758]. The judgment was not final
when Escobedo was decided. (In re Varnum (1965) 63 Ca1.2d
629 [47 Cal.Rptr. 769, 408 P.2d 97].) On this appeal defendant does not challenge his conviction of assault with ,intent to
rob James Fields. He challenges only his conviction of the
robbery, kidnaping, and murder of Norman :Merrill.
[1] On the evening of August 16, 1962, Merrill, a. service
station attendant, was on duty alone. A witness saw him leave
in the company of three male Negroes, one of whom was driving a customer's automobile that was regularly parked at the
station. Summoned to the service station,the owner dis(~overed that about $50 was missing from the cash register.
Early the next day Merrill's wallet containing no money was
fOllnd in the street about 10 miles from the station. That
afternoon his body was discovered face down in a maintenance yard near the place where his wallet had been found.
He hnd been shot twice in the back.
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The transcript testimony of John Ashton Victoria, who testified at the first trial but could not be located for the second,
was the most damaging evidence against defendant. At the
time of the crime Victoria, a schoolboy, fry cook, and busboy,
was living with Edward Jackson who was convicted with defendant at the first trial. Victoria recounted an evening meeting in Jackson's apartment where defendant and his accomplices planned the robbery. They had one gun, and a neighbor, Thomas Hanks, lent them another, a Colt, which defendant carried in the waistband of his trousers when they left the
apartment. They returned about midnight. Victoria testified
that defendant gave the Colt to Hanks and that the trio discussed their having killed the victim. Defendant divided the
money among the three conspirators, and each gave some to
Hanks for the use of his gun.
.
Defendant's fingerprints were found at the service station
on the cardboard box in which credit receipts were kept anll
on the horn ring and the inside of the left front window of
the car used to kidnap the victim. A ballistics .expert testified
that the lethal bullets had been fired by a Colt such as the one
Victoria testified defendant had taken with him.
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts.
[2a] Defendant contends, however, that the trial court
erred in admitting the alleged murder weapon into evidence,
on the ground that it was located as a result of interrogations
conducted without theprelimiuary protections required by
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84
8.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42
Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361].
Police offiers conducted a fruitless search for the gun
throughout the building where the Jacksons lived. They then
prevailed upon Jackson, who was in jail and had confessed, to
telephone his wife, who was in the women's jail, and ask her
to reveal the Jliding place of the gun. Mrs .•Jackson said it was
in the fuse box in the hallway of the apartment building,
where an officer later found it. The officers thus learned of the
hiding place of the gun from both Jackson and his wife who
had not been advised of their constitutional rights. 1'he inquiry had focused on both of them, and they were not in
custody merely as potential witnesses but had been handcuffpd
while being transported to jail and had been booked for the
murder. A1though Mrs. Jackson was not prosecuted for the
offense, she was entitled to be advised of her rights before
being subjected to police inspired and supervised questioning
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by her husband while she was in custody charged with murder. The information elicited from Victoria that implicated
defendant also implicated Jackson as a direct participant and
indicated that his wife might have encouraged commission of
the robbery.
Under these circumstances information and physical evidence secured as a result of questioning the Jacksons without
warning them of their rights could not be used against them.
(People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Ca1.2d 595, 600 [55 Oal.Rptr.
897, 422 P.2d 585] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Oa1.2d 338,
353-354; People v. Bilderbach (1965) 62 Oa1.2d 757, 763-767
[44 Cal.Rptr. 31:3, 401 P.2d 921] ; People v. Ditson (1962) 57
Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Oal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].) The question remains, however, whether defendant has standing to
challenge the violations of the Jacksons' rights.
In c~scs of searches and seizures conducted in violation of
the Fourth Amendment we have held that the defendant has
standing to object even when his own rights were not violated.
(People v. Martin (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760-761 [290 P.2Jl __
855].) Otherwise the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rulc
would be seriously weakened. Defendant contends that we
should apply the same rule to Escobedo-Dorado-Miranda violations effectively to deter unlawful police interrogations. Noncoercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, however, and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights protected by Escobedo, DMado, and M'iranda are violated only when evidence
obtained without the required warnings and waiver is intro.duced against the person whose questioning produced the evi.
dence. The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the
privilege against self-incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 457-470 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 713-721,
86 8.0t. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]), and that privilege is
not violated when the information elicited from an unwarned
suspect is not used against him. (See Murphy v. Waterfront
Com. of New ¥o-rk Harbor (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 78-79 [12
hEd.2d 678, 694-695, 84 8.0t. 1594].) Similarly the right to
counsel protected by Escobedo and Dorado is not infringed
when the exclm;ion of any evidence obtained through the violation of the rules of those cases precludes any 'interference
with the suspect's right to effective representation. (See Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 206-207 [12 L.Ed.
~d 246, 250-251, 84 S.Ct. 1]991.)
[3] Unlike unreasonable
searches and seizures, whidl always violate the Constitution,
there is nothing ullla\'dul ill questioning an unwarneu suspect
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so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologically coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not
use against the suspect any evidence obtained. l [2b] Accordingly, in the absence of such coercive tactics, there is no
basis for excluding physical or other nonhearsay evidence
acquired as a result of questioning a suspect in disregard of
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when such evidence is
offered at the trial of another person.
[4a] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
impeaching Thomas Hanks, a witness called by the prosecution. Hanks had already been convicted and sentenced to
prison for his part in the crimes, and the prosecution called
him to testify that he lent the murder weapon to defendant
_for the purpose of the contemplated robbery. When Hanks
took the stand he claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. Proceeding in the presence of the jury, the trial court
brought out the fact that Hanks was no longer subject to
prosecution because he had already been convicted. It therefore ordered him to answer the questions. Hanks then denied
any personal involvement and any knowledge of defendant's
having take;n part in the crimes.
The information elicited by the trial court did not establish
for this jury the facts that were the basis for Hanks' conviction. Its only effect was to impeach Hanks' testimony by showing his prior conviction of a felony. No error was committed
thereby even if the court's purpose had been to impeach
Hanks instead of to rule on his claim of privilege. 2 The risks
of abuse that had been thought to justify the now discredited
rule against a party's impeaching his own witness (see Evid.
Code, §§ 785, 788, operative January 1, 1967, repealing the
lIn MGUiah v. United State., Il'Upra, the court was careful to point out
the distinction between the legality of secret surveillance and questioning
of an indicted defendant and the unconstitutionality of the use of evidence so obtained against him. "We do not question that in this ease, as
in many eases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the
euspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by
tederal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial."
(377 U.S. at p. 207, 12 L.Ed.2d at p. 251.)
2Even though the questioning by the trial court elicited facts that may
have impeached the credibility of the witness, it did not intimate that the
eourt doubted his credibility or convey any impression to the jury as to
the attitude of the court on anl issue in the case. (See People v.
SflatOB'lW (1911) 161 Cal. 636, 640 L119 P. 1083]; People v. Soeder (1906)
150 Cal. 12, 18-19 [87 P. 1016].)

)
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rule against a party impeaching his own witness; 3 Wigmore,
Evidence, § 896 et seq.) are absent when the impeachment is
undertaken by the court. [5] It is entirely proper for the
court to elicit the fact that a witness has been convicted as an
accomplice in the crime charged. (United States v. Crosby (2d
Cir. 1961) 294 F.2d 928, 948; Wood v. United States (8th Cir.
1960) 279 F.2<l 359, 363; Davenport v. United States (9th Cir.
1958) 260 F.2d 591, 596; Richards v. United States (10th Cir.
1951) 193 F.2d 554, 556; Nemec v. United States (9th Cir.
1949) 178 F.2d 656, 661; see also United States v. Jannsen
(7th Cir. 1964) 339 F.2d 916, 919; United States V. Aronson
(2d Cir. 1963) 319 F.2d 48, 51-52; United States V. Freeman
(2d Cir. 1962) 302 F.2d 347, 350, cert. den. (1963) 375 U.S.
958 [11 L.Ed.2d 316, 84 8.0t. 448].) [4b] Any impeachment in this case was incidental to the court's inquiry into
Hanks' Fifth Amendment privilege, but the court would have
been well advised to make that inquiry outside the presence of
the jury to avoid any possibility of inadvertent prejudice. Its
failure to do so, however, resulted in no error for it merely
brought out impeaching evidence the jury could properly
hear.'
[6] Error committed in the penalty phase of the trial,
however, requires reversal. (People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal2d
164, 170 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398].) The prosecution
encouraged the jury to aggravate defendant's punishment byevidence that he had committed other robberies shortly before
those for which he was tried. This evidence consisted solely of
the testimony of Thomas Hanks, who claimed to be defendant's accomplice in the earlier escapades. Penal Code section
1111 provides that "A conviction cannot be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated. . . ."
Although no "conviction" was involved at the trial on the
issue of penalty, section 1111 cannot be construed to apply
only to the trial on the issue of guilt, for it was enacted long
before the adoption of separate trials of those issues. 4
[7] We have held that" evidence of the earlier crime must
SDefendant contends that in its instructions on the law of accomplice
responsibility the trial court in effect directed the jury to find him guilty.
The court instructed that if anyone had committed the crimes charged,
then Hanks, as a matter of law, was an accomplice. Because the jury
already knew that Hanks had been convicted for his part in the crimes,
defendant argues, the jury could only conclude that he was defendant'e
accomplice. The instruction, however, like the revelation of Hanks' eon·
viction, in no way connected defendant with Hanks.
4Pen. Code, § 1111, was enacted in 1872. The penalty trial procedure
provided by Pen. Code, § 190.1, was not established until 1957.
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meet the rules of admissibility governing proof of that crime
or be otherwise properly admissible in the penalty proceeding." (People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 93, 97 [13 Cal.
Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713] ; People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.
2d 105, 129-131 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412]; People v.
Bentley (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 458, 460-461 [24 Cal.Rptr. 685, 374
P.2d 645].) [8] Moreover, because evidence of other crimes
C'may have a particularly damaging impact on the jury's
determination whether the defendant should be executed
• . ." they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before
the jury may consider them. (People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d
443, 450 [47 Cal.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641] ; see also People v.
Terry (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 137, 149 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d
381].) Accordingly, at the trial on the issue of penalty the
corpus delicti of an earlier crime must be established before
an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession can be admitted
(People v. Hamilton, supra), and an earlier crime cannot be
proved by hearsay (People v. Purvis, supra). [9] For the
same reasons Penal Code section 1111, prohibiting proof of an
earlier crime by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, also applies at the trial on the issue of p~nalty.
The error in admitting the accomplice te~timony was substantial, and it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of
the error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13-; People v. Hines, supra,
61 Ca1.2d 164, 170; People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 105,
137.)
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In
all other respects, it is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Sullivan, J., and White, J., t concurred.
PETERS, J.-I concur with the majority in the reversal as
to penalty, but I dissent insofar as the majority affirm the
balance of the judgment challenged by defendant. That too
should be reversed.
At the trial there was introduced the murder weapon, a
most important piece of evidence for the prosecution. This
gun had been discovered by the police as a direct result of the
improper interrogation of Edward Jackson and his wife, also
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8. 1966.
tBetiredAssociate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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charged with the murder here involved. The majority opinion
frankly admits that the interrogation of the Jacksons was at
the accusatory stage-they were both in jail charged with the
murder, suspicion had focused on them, and the questions
were asked to elicit incriminating information against Varnum as well as the Jacksons. Admittedly, the interrogation of
the Jacksons violated the rules laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People
v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].
'fhere can be 110 doubt that had this evidence been offered
against the Jacksons they could properly have objected to its
admission into evidence. But, say the majority, Varnum, also
charged with the murder, has no "standing" to challenge the
invasion of the Jacksons' constitutional rights. If this holding
is correct then a big hole has been blown in the barriers erected by Escobedo, and its progeny. The beneficent purposes
intended by Escobedo and the more recent case of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 8.Ct. 1602, 10
A.L.R.3d 974], have been to a great extent defeated. I am
convinced that the United States Supreme Court will not and
should not permit such a contraction of its purposes.
This result is reached by the majority although they admit
that in the case of an unlawful search and seizure third persons have standing to urge an illegal search although their
rights are not directly violated. (People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d
755 [290 P.2d 855].) The majority assert, correctly, that the
basis of this rule is that otherwise "the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule would be seriously weakened." Certainly
one can say, with even greater emphasis, that the rule hereadopted by the majority will seriously impair the deterrent
effect on improper police activities intended by Escobedo. A
reading of Escobedo, Dorado, and Miranda demonstrates that
the rules there adopted were adopted largely to deter improper police activities, just as the unlawful search and seizure rules were adopted for the same purpose. The same rule
should be applied to both situations.
The majority also imply that if the confession had been
coerced from the Jacksons, Varnum would have standing to
attack it. But what the majority overlook is that the rules
adopted in Escobedo, Dorado and Miranda were adopted because of the fear that a confession without the required warnings is suspect as coercive. Certainly, the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo and Miranda applied the coercive
confession rules. 'rhey should also be applied here.

l
/
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The majority seem to think that the problem here involved
differs from the unlawful search and seizure situation because
the search and seizure was ab initio illegal, while here the
original interrogation of the Jacksons was "lawful," and
would become unlawful only when and if the confession or its
fruits were introduced into evidence against the Jacksons.
Since the confession was never introduced against the J acksons no error was committed. Thus it is said: "Noncoercivc
questioning is not in itself unlawful" and again, "there is
nothing unlawful in questioning unwarned snspects so long as
the police refrain from physically and psychologically coercive tactics." Such "reasoning" discloses a misconception of
the rules under discussion. Improper interrogation, without
the requisite warnings, violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the witness. It is "unlawful" to interrogate a
suspect without giving him the required warnings from the
very moment of the first question. The right of privacy recognized in Escobedo and Miranda has been violated the moment
interrogation starts. The fact that the most important sanction imposed for violating that right of privacy is inadmissibility of the confession into evidence, and that the defendant
cannot complain in his criminal trial unless the confession is
introduced, does not make the interrogation lawful. The same
can be said about an unlawful search and seizure; yet there is
no doubt that the unlawful search is unlawful when committed, and not when the fruits of such search are introducerl
into evidence. The one thing made crystal clear by Escobedo
and certainly by the explanation of that case in Miranda is
that it is unlawful to interrogate without giving the required
warnings.
What the sanction may be if the confession is not introduced we need not now determine. All that we have to determine is that the interrogation was unlawful. Violation of the
}'ourth Amendment occurs at the time of the unlawful search.
Violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs the moment defendant is induced to give incriminating information. Violation of
the Sixth Amendment occurs the moment the accused is
interrogated without being informed of the right to counsel.
What the majority fail to realize is that Escobedo, Dorado
and Miranda pushed back the impact of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments from the courtroom to the police station.
Carried to its logical conclusion the rule that interrogation
is not unlawful until the results of that interrogation are
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introduced in evidence in a criminal trial, suggested by the
majority, woulU mean that the privilege against selfincrimination does not exist when a witness is interrogated by
a legislative committee because legislative committees are not
engaged in criminal trials. I am sure the majority intended no
such ridiculous result, but that would seem to be the result of
their reasoning.
In support of its contention that the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not occur until the evidence is used against the accused the majority rely on
Murphy v. Waterfront Com. 0/ New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52,
78-79 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 694-695, 84 S.Ct. 1594]. That is the
case that repudiated the old rule that one jurisdiction could
compel a witness to testify where his testimony, although not
incriminatory in that jurisdiction might incriminate him
under the laws of another jurisdiction. The state had granted
the witness immunity under state law, but he claimed the
privilege on the ground that his testimony would incriminate
him under federal law.
It was held that under its grant of immunity the state
could compel the witness to testify and that the witness'
privilege would be protected by precluding the federal authorities from using the testimony in a criminal prosecution
against him. But this holding does not support the thesis oj
the majority. The court adopted the rule announced t(
"accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Govern·
ments in investigating" crime. Unless the state under iu
immunity statute could take the testimony the whole purposl
of the immunity statutes would be defeated in many, if no
most, situations for which they were designed. No such com
peting state and federal interests are llere involved.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 [12 L.Ed.2c
246, 250-251, 84 8. Ct. 1199], is alsO' relied upon by th
majority to support their conclusion that the right of th
accused to counsel is not violated until the prosecutin
authorities attempt to use the words elicited while the accuse.
was without a lawyer. It is true that that case states that th
accused was denied his right to counsel when the confessio
was introduced. But there is nothing in that opinion to ind
cate that there was no violation of the accused's rights if tll
confession is not used at trial. Tn Escobedo where the accuse
demanded the right to counsel the rights of the accused weI
violated immediately upon that request bl·ing uenied.

)

~,
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Implicit in the holding that noncoercive questioning is
lawful until the confession is introduced in a criminal trial is
the concept that such noncoercive interrogation is desirable
and to be encouraged. To the contrary Escobedo, Dorado anti
Miranda tell us in no uncertain terms that all such interrogations are to be discouraged. Insofar as we permit the fruits of
an interrogation in violation of those cases to be introduced
into evidence we are encouraging not deterring unlawful
police activity.
The practical effects of such a holding cannot be minimized.
What the majority have done is to attempt to turn a doctrine
protective of constitutional rights into a rule of evidence. It
must be remembered that the rule of the majority holding
that interrogation without warnings is lawful nut only
encourages such interrogations but also encourages officers to
ignore express requests for counsel and to ignore assertions of
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination. Under
Dorado and Miranda the same rules are applicable to both
situations. In Miranda the court unequivocally covered the
situation under discussion in the following language. (Mimnda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d 694 at
p. 723, 86 8.0t. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) "If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. [Footnote omitted.] At this point he has shown
that lIe intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. . . . If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present. "
I interpret those words as limitations on police activitythe majority do not. A conscientious police officer must, of
course, try to obtain evidence by every lawful means. Now he
is impliedly told by the majority that, where there are multiple suspects, he may, without giving the required warnings
and despite the suspect's request for counselor desire to
remain silent, interrogate one suspect in violation of these
rights in the hope of getting admissible evidence against thf'
other suspects. The majority opinion can be interpreted as not
only condoning but in effect encouraging such violation of
fundament..'11 constitutional rights.
I would hold the admission of the gun was error, and under
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the facts clearly prejudicial. I would reverse the entire judgment appealed from.
BURKE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as
to guilt but dissent from the reversal of the judgment as to
penalty. In my opinion it is not reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to defendant would have been reached
had the asserted error relating to the testimony of Thomas
Hanks not been committed. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;· People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].) Hanks
testified that he, defendant and others committed two robberies on the street, that defendant was unarmed on both
occasions, and that on neither occasion was the victim hurt.
These offenses were of a minor character compared to the
other crimes defendant committed, and they added little to
the pros~cution 's case. It appears that defendant brutally
killed his robbery victim, J ames Merrill, by shooting him
twice in the back after robbing him and kidnaping him for
the purpose of robbery. Defendant also committed an assault
with an intent to commit robbery upon James Fields, and
during the commission of that offense after Fields had fallen
defendant pointed his revolver directly at Fields and pulled
the trigger. In addition defendant has twice been convicted of
the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle.
Furthermore, at the penalty trial the court informed the
jury that "the general instructions having to do with credi.
bility of witnesses and so forth [given at the guilt trial]
apply to this phase of the case as well as to the other one,"
and at the guilt trial the court fully instructed the jury
regarding the law relating to an accomplice's testimony. The
instructions informed the jury that the testimony of an
accomplice is to be viewed with distrust and that a conviction
may not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it
is corroborated, and the instructions further defined an
accomplice, stated that if the offenses involving Merrill were
committed by anyone then as a matter of law Hanks was an
Hccomplice, and explained what corroboration is sufficient. In
view of these instrnetions and the further instruction given at
the penalty trial that evidence of other crimes may not be
('onsidered as evidence unless proved beyond a reasonabledoubt, it does not appear that the alleged error was prejudicial.
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966.

)

)

Under the circumstances, in my opinion the alleged error
relating to Hanks' testimony did not result in a miscarriage
of justice, and I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28,
1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself
disqualified. Peter:s, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.:
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